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Informal Network Finance as a Risk Coping Device  
in Mountainous Laos
Ohno Akihiko* and Chansathith Chaleunsinh**
Rural households in developing countries face difficulty in no small part in managing 
emergent expenditures on various events.  It is commonly observed that rural 
households put up money for each other and swap small amounts of rice or other 
food stuffs with neighbors to cope with idiosyncratic shocks.  This network finance 
plays an important role in supporting rural households facing an emergency with 
little or no administrative cost, especially in the society where formal safety-net 
mechanisms are de facto absent.  As network finance is likely to function within a 
narrow range of blood and geographical proximity, the households tend to form a 
network in similar economic circumstances.  Then, it can be assumed that the 
effectiveness of network finance will be vulnerable for the poor households whose 
network members belong to a similar stratum.  This paper examines the accessi-
bility of the poor to network finance, using household data collected in the hinter-
lands of Luang Prabang, Laos.  We found that the poor can resort feebly to network 
finance.  Therefore, the role of savings groups to mitigate shocks is more important 
for the poorer households.
Keywords: Laos, transitory shocks, network finance, safety-net, blood and 
geographical proximity
I Introduction
Living with various risks, rural low-income households in developing countries face dif-
ficulty in no small part in managing emergent expenditures on various events.  Among 
various shocks, temporary diseases represent a typical shock.  Though formal insurance 
schemes are de facto absent in rural areas of developing countries, rural households are 
known to maintain various informal risk coping measures to mitigate adverse shocks.
Households save for various reasons.  The better off are likely to save mainly for 
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long-term need, lumpy expenditures including those required in their life cycle, while 
the worse off save to smooth consumption.  This quested for the investigation of micro-
insurance as a forgotten third function of microfinance (Zeller and Sharma 2002).
Risk-coping measures that incur cash expenditure can be dichotomized into self-
insurance and interpersonal insurance (hereafter, network finance).  Self-insurance 
including withdrawing savings (Jalan and Ravallion 2001) and livestock sales (Kazianga 
and Udry 2006; McPeak 2004) is a major strategy to mitigate such shocks.  However, it 
is commonly observed that rural households put up money for each other and swap small 
amounts of rice or other food stuffs with neighbors.
Development economics have investigated village insurance, where village house-
holds insure each other against idiosyncratic shocks.  Informal insurance arrangements 
based on informal networks such as family members, relatives, and friends serve as vital 
risk-coping measures (Platteau and Abraham 1987; Rosenzweig 1988; Udry 1994; 
 Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007).  Though a full insurance hypoth-
esis within a community or network is empirically rejected, many studies reveal that 
partial insurance mechanisms do exist (Townsend 1994; Grimard 1997; Armendariz and 
Morduch 2005; de Weerdt and Dercon 2006).  Recent literature reveals that family and 
relatives in the village provide loan for production or consumption purposes (La Ferrara 
2003), or they make income transfer to those who suffered from shocks (Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2001; Park 2003).
Note that network finance is likely to function within a narrow range of blood and 
geographical proximity.  As the households tend to form a network in similar economic 
circumstances, the effectiveness of network finance will be vulnerable for the poor house-
holds whose network members belong to a similar stratum.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the availability of network finance with 
respect to household wealth in the mountainous areas of Laos where a market economy 
is at an incipient stage.  The household data (N=490) we use are collected by our unique 
household survey conducted in 2010 and 2011 in Luang Prabang Province of Laos.  This 
paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we examine how transitory shocks are finan-
cially coped with.  Section 3 examines network finance in terms of rice transfer.  Section 
4 discusses the range of network finance based on the regression analysis.  Finally, sec-
tion 5 summarizes the main findings and discusses their implications.
II Financial Expenditures to Cope with Transitory Shocks
Among various shocks rural households face, diseases represent a major idiosyncratic 
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shock that incurs financial expenditures not only due to the direct costs for medical treat-
ment but also indirect costs for the missing labor force.1)  As discussed in the second 
paper of this special issue by Fujita, Ohno, and Chansathith, medical treatment is the 
primary reason for borrowing from savings groups.  The proportion of households report-
ing transitory disease over the preceding two years of the survey is 78.57% (385 HHs), 
of which 59.48% received medical treatment that incurred expenditure (Table 1).  For 
those who experienced medical treatment, average expenditure was 841.5 thousand kip 
(approximately US$85) that accounted for 16.79% of annual cash income.
Non-disease shocks such as funeral, wedding, poor harvest, childbirth, and school 
fee also entail unexpected expenditures.  Average expenditure per shock was 3,789.43 
thousand kip (US$379) for those who encountered shocks.  This accounted for as high 
as 23.49% of annual cash income.  However, expenditures on such non-disease shocks, 
especially funeral and wedding constitute social obligations and thus community members 
and relatives would provide financial support for such events.  In addition, the incidence 
of non-disease shocks is far lower than that of transitory diseases.  Thus, this paper 
focuses on the shocks caused by transitory diseases.2)
Table 2 shows how the surveyed households in Luang Prabang extend expenditure 
to cope with transitory disease and other exigencies that took place in the preceding two 
years of the survey.  Emergencies are primarily addressed by self-insurance (own- 
savings).  Self-insurance (own savings and selling property) accounts for 70 to 80% of 
the expenditures on shocks.
Though mostly being poor, the surveyed households do not entirely lack cash in 
hand.  Approximately nearly a half of the households have more than 300 thousand kip 
(approximately US$30) at home (Table 3).  Three hundred thousand kip is almost equiv-
1) As to the surveyed households, average work-days lost due to temporary illness for the households 
whose member suffered from transitory illness were 6.6 days.
2) The proportion of households having members suffering chronic disease is 29.18% (143/490) and 
average expenditure per affected household is 3,257.79 thousand kip.  However, neither informal 
insurance mechanisms nor depleting assets can cope with these events.













Transitory disease 78.57 59.48 16.79 841.50
Other exigencies 10.61 23.49 3,789.43
Source: Authors.
Note: a) For those who experienced expenditure.
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alent to 10 days’ agricultural wages in the areas.  As will be discussed later, even in the 
villages of backward areas, villagers hoard money at home.  This reflects poor accessibil-
ity to bank institutions and presents the prospects for an expansion of savings groups in 
the areas.
Beside self-insurance, selling assets (mostly livestock, such as buffalos and pigs), 
drawing down savings, and network finance serve as important parts of this mix.  Live-
stock in poor villages works an indispensable store of convertible asset to deal with 
shocks.
III Rice Transfer
In-kind transfers are fairly frequent rather than cash in developing countries (Collins et 












Disease 69.14 11.56 10.73 4.44 4.14 100.00
Others 49.94 21.37 16.01 2.02 10.66 100.00
Source: Authors.
Note: Network finance includes borrowing and gift.  Savings group includes borrowing and the withdrawal of 
savings.
Table 3 Cash in Hand (March)
(%)
Cash (kip) >100,000 –100,000 –300,000 –500,000 <500,000 Total
Advanced area
Xieng Lek 5.9 11.8 23.5 14.7 44.1 100.0
Kogneiw 11.1 18.5 25.9 11.1 33.3 100.0
Sop Houn 6.1 8.2 22.4 22.4 40.8 100.0
Backward area
Had Sao 14.3 25.7 22.9 20.0 17.1 100.0
Sop Khon 17.5 17.5 25.0 10.0 30.0 100.0
Houei Hoi 3.8 19.2 23.1 15.4 38.5 100.0
Sop Khan 3.0 21.2 36.4 9.1 30.3 100.0
Had Chan 0.0 26.7 36.7 10.0 26.7 100.0
Average 8.0 17.9 26.6 14.6 32.8 100.0
Source: Authors.
Note: No significant difference across months.
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al. 2009).  In the villages we surveyed, the incidence of rice transfer is the ordinary affairs 
of life along with money transfer to cope with idiosyncratic shocks.
Fig. 1 presents village-wise association between the fraction of households receiv-
ing rice transfer (proportion of households who received rice transfer in the preceding 
three years of the survey) and that reporting rice insufficiency (the proportion of net 
rice-purchasing households).  Transfer includes both borrowing and gift.  Of the sample, 
85 households (17.34%) received rice transfer.  Among them, 44 received rice-gift and 
41 borrowed rice.  On average, the former received 58.2 kilogram and the latter 56.6 
kilogram of rice.  Beside, 57 households borrowed 56.6 kilogram of rice on average from 
rice-banks run by international NGO.  Xieng Lek is an outlier because paddy cultivation 
is not practiced there.  As rice transfer is more common in the villages where the propor-
tion of net rice-purchasing households is high, rice transfer is supposed to work as a 
device to mitigate rice insufficiency.
Cox (1987) considered three motives of transfer: market exchange, gift exchange, 
and altruism.  The last two constitute the motives of network transfer—transfer embed-
ded in social relations.  Motive is regarded as gift exchange when a donor helps a donee 
anticipating donee’s reciprocity someday in the future when needed.3)  Gift exchange 
here includes mutual insurance, in which one helps the other only when the latter is in 
Fig. 1 Rice Insufficiency and Transfer
Source: Authors.
3) Fafchamps and Lund (2003) revealed that in the rural Philippines motive of gift giving is returning 
favor to other households that provided loan or gave gift to them before.  This indicates that recipro-
cal gift exchange sustains the social network among households.
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need.  On the other hand, motive is regarded as altruism or pure gift-giving when a donor 
helps a donee just because caring about the well-being of a donee increases the utility of 
the donor.
Efficacy of gift exchange and altruisms depends on whom the social network is 
formed with.  Previous studies suggest that support by family member is featured as pure 
gift-giving based on altruism, while support by friends as gift exchange.  Park (2003) found 
that income transfer among siblings in Indonesia tends to be provided to those who have 
lower income, younger age, and female headed households, and hence argued that the 
income transfer among siblings are motivated by altruism.  Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) 
showed that for the rural households in South Asia income transfer to friends is more 
likely to be affected by the history of past income transfer (net income transfer to coun-
terparts in past years) than income transfer to family is.
As Fafchamps and Lund (2003) show in the rural Philippines, relatives and friends 
are considered to be the major risk sharing partners for rural households.  While risk 
sharing with non-kin entails the problem of limited commitment (Coate and Ravallion 
1993; Ligon et al. 2002), the problem is mitigated by altruism (Foster and Rosenzweig 
2001) with respect to risk sharing with kin.  Thus, non-kin is supposed to be less reliable 
than kin as a provider of support in times of negative shocks.
Table 4 indicates the proportion of households that received money or time help 
(Money-Help and Time-Help respectively) from different groups in time of emergency. 
Also the proportion of households that assisted others when they necessitated the 
respondents in the preceding three years is presented.  Help is available more from kin 
than from non-kin, and more from those living in the same village than those living out-
Table 4 Help in Time of Emergency from Different Groups
(%)
Money-Help Time-Help
Received Assisted R2 Received Assisted R2
Brothers/sisters 55.7 63.3 0.61 80.0 80.0 0.77
Relatives in 45.6 48.7 0.69 69.6 71.5 0.80
Relatives out 31.5 35.3 0.75 56.7 58.3 0.77
Friends in 36.5 41.8 0.76 66.7 70.7 0.80
Friends out 26.3 29.5 0.76 52.2 53.4 0.81
Source: Authors.
Notes: 1) Question for Money-Help: [Received] Have you received money help when you are in an emergency 
from the followings in the last three years?  [Assisted] Have you offered money help to the follow-
ings when they were in an emergency?
2) Question for Time-Help: [Received] Have you called on the followings to spend a lot of time for 
helping out when there were a serious emergency in your household in the last three years? 
[Assisted] Have you offered time for helping out the followings when they were in an emergency?
3) “In” and “out” denote in the village and outside the village respectively.
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side the village.  Both blood and geographical proximity matter.  What is interesting is 
that the receiving and assisting experiences show significantly high correlations (p<0.1%, 
Spearman).  Thus, such help is said highly reciprocal.  That the correlation for money 
help from brothers/sisters is lower than those of others implies that money help from 
brothers/sisters is relatively characterized as pure gift rather than gift exchange.  This 
will lead us further into a consideration on the efficacy of network finance with respect 
to blood and geographical proximity.
IV Range of Network Finance
Informal network finance plays an important role in supporting low-income households 
in time of emergency with little or no administrative cost.  However, as network finance 
functions within a narrow rage in terms of blood and geographical proximity, it is likely 
that the households that form a network belong to a similar economic stratum.  Thus, it 
is hypothesized that the effectiveness of network finance is likely to be vulnerable for 
the poor households.
To examine this hypothesis, we consider perceived plausibility of rice transfer (rice 
gift and rice borrowing) from others.  Economics tend to examine the effect of observed 
Fig. 2 Rice Gift
Source: Authors.
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income transfer in an emergency (for example, Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Fafchamps 
and Gubert 2007).  However, idiosyncratic nature of such events is likely to incur selec-
tion bias.  Thus, we explore the effect of potential (or perceived) support from other 
households—a belief that one is entitled to support from them—which is widely analyzed 
in the field of psychology as perceived family and peer support (for example, Stice et al. 
2004; Seidman et al. 1999; Procidano and Heller 1983).
Perceived rice support (rice-gift) is measured by a question: Suppose there were a 
serious emergency in your household and you are faced with rice insufficiency.  Generally 
speaking, do the followings (brothers/sisters, relatives in the village, relatives outside 
the village, friends in the village, and friends outside the village) extend rice to you with-
out an obligation of repayment?  (No=1, Yes, but a little=2, Yes, moderately=3, and Yes 
definitely=4).4)  Then, a question about rice-borrowing follows.  The results are pre-
sented in Figs. 2 and 3.  As is shown in Table 5, brothers/sisters are most reliable in 
obtaining rice gift, and relatives residing in the village follow.  Friends residing outside 
Fig. 3 Rice Borrowing
Source: Authors.
4) Rice transfer in case of emergency can be measured as giving rather than receiving.  However, 
asking an intention of giving would let respondents put on an impressive show, and overestimates 
the scores.
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the village are least dependable.  We continued to ask a similar question about rice bor-
rowing.  Needless to say, rice borrowing is an easier way to obtain rice than rice gift as 
long as the households can repay (Table 5).
To analyze the link between household wealth and expected support, we use the 
following model (Standardized Regression Model):
Rice = αX + βWealth + γSocial Capital + δVD + ε
where X is a set of household characteristics that include age and education attainments 
of household head, marital status, savings group membership, and net rice surplus.  As 
those control variables are found statistically insignificant, they are not displayed in the 
results.  Wealth is cash income per adult male unit [PI] (unit: 10,000 kip).  Cash income 
includes imputed value of rice consumption (2,000 kip/kilogram) out of rice production. 
Social capital is gauged by a question asking if the respondent can trust villagers (No=1~ 
Yes=4).  VD is a village dummy.
Dependent variable of Rice is either Rice-Gift or Rice-Borrowing scores, and Rice-
Gift and Borrowing from five classes of people classified by blood and geographical 
proximity.  Rice-Gift and Rice-Borrowing scores are obtained as the principal component 
score (Rubin Anderson) using the level of the five perceived supports from brothers/
sisters to friends living outside the village (Cronbach α=0.95 and 0.95, variance=69.7% 
and 67.5% respectively).  The scores denote respondent’s expectation of gift/borrowing 
from neighbors and relatives in case of emergency.  Thus, the scores represent acces-
sibility to informal support.
As is shown in Table 6, the coefficients of PI are negative and significant for rice-gift 
functions.  As average PI is 0.41 and standard deviation is 1.52, most of the data exist on 
the left side of the inverted U-shape functions.  With regard to rice borrowing functions, 
they are negative and significant except brothers/sisters and friend outside the village. 
As was shown in Table 5, brothers/sisters and relatives are most reliable sources of rice 
Table 5 Average Score of Rice
Rice-Gift Rice-Borrowing
Brothers/sisters 3.10 (1.23) 3.61 (0.85)
Relatives in 2.69 (1.20) 3.25 (1.01)
Relatives outside 2.25 (1.20) 2.85 (1.18)
Friends in 2.31 (1.18) 2.82 (1.13)
Friends outside 1.99 (1.11) 2.47 (1.22)
Source: Authors.
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
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transfer.  Accordingly, the results imply that the poor households are more likely to find 
it difficult to obtain support from any strata of people, mainly because the network house-
holds of the poor are likely to be poor as well.
Stark contrasts exist between the regression results of Rice-Gift and Rice- Borrowing 
from brothers/sisters and from friends outside the village.  While all variables in Table 6 
are significant for Rice-Gift, they are insignificant for Rice-Borrowing.  Considering the 
fact that blood and geographical proximity concern the reliability of rice transfer, Rice-
Borrowing from brothers/sisters is featured as reciprocal.
V Conclusion
Network finance plays an important role in supporting rural households facing an emer-
gency with little or no administrative cost, especially in the society where formal safety-
net mechanisms are de facto absent.  However, the poor have weaker accessibility to 












































Adj-R2 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03












































Adj-R2 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07
F-Value 1.93** 0.08 1.62** 2.33*** 1.88** 2.02**
Source: Authors.
Note: “In” and “out” denote in the village and outside the village respectively.  Village dummies are included, 
but not displayed.  ** p<5%, *** p<1%.
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network finance.  As the range of network finance is subject to blood and geographical 
proximity, network partners of the poor belong to a similar wealth bracket.  Thus, they 
cannot afford to offer financial help or rice transfer to the fellow people.
This paper examined the accessibility of the poor to network finance, using house-
hold data collected in the hinterlands of Luang Prabang, Laos.  We found that the poor 
can resort feebly to network finance.  Therefore, the role of savings groups to mitigate 
shocks is more important for the poorer households.
As a market economy is not prevalent in the surveyed areas, and thus cash economy 
has not picked up stream yet.  Savings groups established in such economy have only a 
weak momentum for growth.  Even in the initial stage of savings group movement, 
however, as Zeller and Sharma (2002) refer to micro-insurance as the forgotten third of 
microfinance, savings groups serve a vital role in coping with idiosyncratic shocks.
Accepted: December 22, 2014
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